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CIVIL PROCEDURE-AvoIDING DUPLICATIVE LITIGATION-
THE "FIRST-FILED" RULE
EEOC v. University of Pennsylvania (1988)
The dilemma of duplicative litigation is presented when two federal
district courts contemporaneously exercise jurisdiction over proceed-
ings involving the same parties and issues.' In order to avoid duplica-
tive litigation, federal courts have invoked the "first-filed" rule which
permits jurisdiction to be retained by the forum which first possessed
the subject matter and enjoined in the forum with second possession.-
However, the first-filed rule is not a firm legal principle to be applied
mechanically, but rather an equitable principle.3 Therefore, given ap-
1. Duplicative litigation in federal district courts presents such evils as
threatened judicial comity, inconsistent burdens, inefficient administration of
justice and economic waste. See EEOC v. University of Pa., 850 F.2d 969, 971
(3d Cir.), cert. granted in part, 109 S. Ct. 554 (1988); West Gulf Maritime Ass'n v.
ILA Deep Sea Local 24, 751 F.2d 721, 728-29 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844
(1985). Therefore, even though "no precise rule has evolved, the general prin-
ciple is to avoid duplicative litigation." Colorado River Water Conservation
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976).
This casebrief will discuss the controversy that exists when parties file con-
temporaneous actions in different federal district courts which involve very simi-
lar issues. Considerations other than those discussed herein come into play
when deciding which court should retain jurisdiction when one party files in fed-
eral court and another files in state court or the court of a foreign sovereign.
For a discussion of those considerations, see generally 17A C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4247 (1988) (con-
temporaneous state and federal litigation); Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea
v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1981) (contemporaneous liti-
gation in the District Court for Western District of Pennsylvania and court of a
foreign sovereign), rev'd on other grounds, 724 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1983).
2. University of Pa., 850 F.2d at 979; see, e.g., IVest Gulf Maritime, 751 F.2d at
728 (district court abused its discretion when it rejected first-filed rule); Paceset-
ter Sys. v. Medtronic, Inc., 678 F.2d 93, 94 (9th Cir. 1982) (dismissal of second-
filed action was not abuse of discretion); Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth.
v. Ragonese, 617 F.2d 828, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (affirmed dismissal of second-
filed action); Mattel, Inc. v. Louis Marx & Co., 353 F.2d 421, 423-24 (2d Cir.
1965) (judge in second-filed action abused discretion by staying first-filed ac-
tion), cert. dismissed, 384 U.S. 948 (1966); Triangle Conduit & Cable Co, N. Na-
tional Elec. Prods. Corp., 125 F.2d 1008, 1009 (3d Cir.) (duty of court below to
enjoin second-filed action), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 676 (1942); Crosley Corp. v.
Hazeltine Corp., 122 F.2d 925, 929 (3d Cir. 1941) (refusal to enjoin second-filed
action is abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 813 (1942).
3. See Universitiy of Pa., 850 F.2d at 972. "The letter and spirit of the first-
filed rule . . . are grounded on equitable principles." Id. at 977. Federal courts
have the power, not the right, to enjoin subsequent proceedings; their rulings
may be reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. at 971-72.
In Kerotest ,'lanufacturing Co. v. C-O-Tzo Fire Equipment Co., the Third Circuit
stated that its previous decisions, in which the first-filed rule was invoked, were
not intended to establish a "rule of thumnb." The real question, the court held,
(583)
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propriate circumstances, federal courts have the discretion to bypass the
first-filed rule and retain jurisdiction over the second-filed action. 4 Re-
cently, the Third Circuit held that exceptional circumstances existed
which justified the district court's departure from the first-filed rule in
EEOC v. University of Pennsylvania .5
In University of Pennsylvania, a faculty member of the University of
Pennsylvania (the University), to whom tenure had been denied, filed
discrimination charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (the EEOC). 6 In cooperating with the EEOC investigation, the
University surrendered many documents to the EEOC, but refused to
supply peer review reports which the University had used in making its
tenure decisions. 7 Consequently, the EEOC issued a subpoena for the
peer review reports, the identity of members of the University's person-
nel committee and the identity, tenure status and qualifications of mem-
bers of the peer review committee,8 The University requested that the
is not which suit is first-filed, but rather, which will provide relief more expedi-
tiously and effectively. Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 189 F.2d
31, 34-35 (3d Cir. 1951), aff'd, 342 U.S. 180 (1952). The Supreme Court af-
firmed, noting that there is no rigid rule. Kerotest, 342 U.S. at 184 n.3. For a
discussion of circuit court rulings regarding the first-filed rule, see infra notes 4,
26-29, 55 and accompanying text.
4. See University of Pa., 850 F.2d at 972. The Third Circuit stated that the
first-filed rule need not be invoked when (1) bad faith is present, (2) the first
party to file has engaged in forum shopping, (3) the second-filed action has de-
veloped further than the first, or (4) the first suit was filed in anticipation of an
imminent action in a less favorable forum. Id. at 976. See Tempco Elec. Heater
Corp. v. Omega Eng'g, Inc., 819 F.2d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1987); Orthmann v.
Apple River Campground, Inc., 765 F.2d 119, 121 (8th Cir. 1985); Yoder v.
Heinold Commodities, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 756, 761 (E.D. Va. 1986) (first-filed
action did not include all parties to second); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Grand
Trunk W. R.R., 592 F. Supp. 562, 568 (E.D. Pa. 1984). For additional discussion
of circumstances in which the first-filed rule would not be invoked, see infa
notes 26-29, 55 and accompanying text.
5. 850 F.2d 969, 972 (3d Cir.), cert. granted in part, 109 S. Ct. 554 (1988).
Certiori has been granted solely on the question of whether compelled disclosure
of faculty peer review tenure materials violates the University's first amendment
interests.
6. University of Pa., 850 F.2d at 972. The faculty member alleged that the
University denied tenure on the basis of sex (female) and race (Asian). Id.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was created pur-
suant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (1982). The EEOC is the administrative agency
created to process individual discrimination charges. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 769 (BNA 1976). The EEOC has the power
to promulgate procedural regulations, investigate and subpoena. Id. at 769-79.
Specifically, the EEOC can issue subpoenas requiring production of evidence.
Id. at 778. If the respondent refiuses to comply with the subpoena and has not
filed a petition to revoke the subpoena, the EEOC may petition the district court
to enforce the subpoena. Id.
7. 'niversity of Pa., 850 F.2d at 972. The University also refused to provide
the peer review reports for live male tenure candidates. Id.
8. Id, The EEOC stated that in order to compare denial of tenure to one
faculty member with the treatment of tlc other live faculty members, examina-
[Vol. 34: p. 583
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EEOC exclude the confidential peer review material, from the subpoena,
urging that confidentiality in the review process was imperative to yield
results which truly reflected the faculty member's worthiness of tenure.l
The EEOC refused, noting that the Third Circuit's decision in
EEOC v. Franklin & Marshall College I0 required such disclosure. I Fur-
ther, the EEOC informed the University that proceedings to enforce the
subpoena would be initiated unless it responded within twenty days. 12
Prior to the expiration of this twenty-day period, the University filed an
action in the District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a declar-
atory judgment and injunctive relief. 13
The EEOC then instituted proceedings to enforce the subpoena in
the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.' 4 The Uni-
versity requested that the district judge for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania invoke the first-filed rule to dismiss the second-filed action. 15
tion of all of the subpoenaed materials was necessary. Id. at 972-73. The EEOC
claimed that it had such power because its enabling legislation provided that the
EEOC "shall have access to ... and the right to copy any evidence of any person
being investigated or proceeded against that relates to unlawful employment
practices covered by this subchapter and is relevant to the charge under investi-
gation." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1982). For a discussion of the EEOC and its
subpoena power, see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
9. University of Pa., 850 F.2d at 972-73. The University urged that the socie-
tal and constitutional interests in the confidentiality of the peer review process
outweighed the EEOC's need for investigative materials. Id.
10. 775 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986). In
Franklin & Marshall, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to
compel disclosure of the peer review material involved in a tenure discrimina-
tion complaint. Id. at 117. The court declined to adopt an academic peer review
privilege which would eliminate confidential peer review material from thi sub-
poena. Id. at 111. The court ruled that peer review material relating to a tenure
discrimination complaint was relevant and enforced the subpoena. Id. at 117.
However, the names and identifying data of the faculty members were to be
omitted. Id.
11. University of Pa., 850 F.2d at 972-73.
12. Id. at 973.
13. Id. More specifically stated, the twenty-day grace period began April
14, 1987, expired May 4, 1987 and the University filed the action in the District
of Columbia on May 1, 1987. Id. The University alleged violation of the first
and fifth amendments and § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Id.
(citing 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982)). In addition, the University requested that the
subpoena be quashed. Id. The University stated that the action was filed ill the
District of Columbia in order to settle the constitutional and APA defenses as
"more was at stake than the single question of the [EEOC's] possible enforce-
ment of ... its subpoena against the University." Id.
14. Id. At this point, there was contemporaneous litigation of similar issues
by the same parties in courts of equal rank and concurrent jurisdiction. The
action was first-filed in the District of Columbia and second-filed in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania. Id.
15. Id. The University cited the Third Circuit's decision in Crosley Corp. v.
Hazeltine Corp., 122 F.2d 925 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 813 (1942),
which held that the party who first-filed should "be free from the vexation of
subsequent litigation over the same subject matter." Id. at 930.
3
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In the alternative, the University requested permission to raise constitu-
tional and Administrative Procedure Act (APA)I defenses in the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania proceedings and sought discovery to
support those claims.) 7 The district judge for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania denied the University's motion to dismiss and the discov-
ery requests.I" Moreover, the judge ordered that the University pro-
duce the subpoenaed documents within ten days.' 9 The University
appealed to the Third Circuit.2
0
The Third Circuit acknowledged that circumstances which called
for application of the first-filed rule were present in University of Penn-
sylvania.2' First, the court recognized that adjudication of essentially the
For a discussion of Crosley v. Hazeltine, see infra note 21.
16. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-570 (1982 & Supp. 1986). The APA provides proce-
dural requirements for "broad classes of actions taken by many different agen-
cies." R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS
§ 6.1 (1985).
17. University of Pa., 850 F.2d at 973 & n.l. The University alleged that the
EEOC was participating in agency rulemaking without notice in violation of the
APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982). University of Pa., 850 F.2d at 981. In addition,
the University alleged that the EEOC subpoena compelled disclosure in viola-
tion of the first and fifth amendments. Id. at 979. For a more detailed discussion
of the constitutional and APA defenses, see infra note 40.
18. University of Pa., 850 F.2d at 973-74. At oral argument, the district
judge suggested that the University hurriedly filed the first action in the District
of Columbia in order to avoid adverse precedent in the Third Circuit. Adverse
precedent was established in EEOC v. Franklin & Marshall College, 775 F.2d
110 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986). Counsel for the University
responded that even though this avoidance might have been a consideration,
jurisdiction was proper in the District of Columbia. University of Pa., 850 F.2d at
973. "
19. University of Pa., 850 F.2d at 973-74.
20. Id. at 971. The EEOC requested that the District Court for the District
of Columbia, where the University first-filed, stay adjudication in that district
until resolution of the appeal in the Third Circuit. Id. at 974. The District of
Columbia judge denied the request. Id.
21. The Third Circuit first dealt with the first-filed rule in Crosley Corp. v.
Hazeltine Corp., 122 F.2d 925 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 813 (1942),
where the circuit court reversed the district court's denial of a motion to stay the
second-filed action. Id at 930. The Third Circuit quoted Chief Justice Mar-
shall's "salutary rule that '[i]n all cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the court
which first has possession of the subject must decide it.' " Id. at 929 (quoting
Smith v. M'Iver, 22 U.S. 532, 535 (9 Wheat. 1824)). The Third Circuit's justifi-
cations for invoking the first-filed rule included yielding a single determination
of a controversy, preventing economic waste, providing prompt and efficient ad-
ministration of justice and fulfilling the purposes of the Declaratory Judgment
Act. Id. at 930.
Similarly, the Third Circuit invoked the first-filed rule in Triangle Conduit
& Cable Co. v. National Electric Products Corp., 125 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir.), cert
denied, 316 U.S. 676 (1942). In Triangle, National formally notified Triangle that
Triangle was infringing on 11 of National's patents. Id. at 1008. One week later,
Triangle filed a declaratory judgment action in the District Court [or the )istrict
of Delaware. Id. Next, National filed an infringement action against Triangle in
the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Id. The district court in
586 [Vol. 34: p. 583
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same issue by two courts of equal dignity could result in inconsistent
rulings. 22 In addition, the Third Circuit noted that both parties were
legally entitled to file the suit in the chosen forums. 23 The court stated,
however, that these jurisdictional guideposts did not address another
federal policy-that of federal comity. The dispositive issue before the
Third Circuit was whether the district judge for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania had abused his discretion by not invoking the first-filed
rule. 24
Delaware refused Triangle's motion to enjoin National's infringement suit until
the Delaware adjudication was complete. Id. at 1009. The Third Circuit re-
versed the district court's ruling and enjoined the second-filed action, stating
that the district court should have followed the first-filed rule adopted in Croslev
v. Hazeltine. Id. at 1009-10.
22. University of Pa., 850 F.2d at 974. The Third Circuit noted the possibil-
ity that the District Court for the District of Columbia might enjoin the EEOC's
subpoena which had already been held to be valid by the Pennsylvania district
court. Id. Although the first-filed rule could be applied here to avoid duplicative
litigation and possible inconsistent burdens, the court stated that the University
created the potential conflict in order to "initiate its constitutional challenge in a
more friendly forum." Id. at 974-75. The District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia had not dealt with the issue of confidentiality in the academic peer review
process. Id. at 975. However, the "University perceive[d] the District of Colum-
bia as favoring its position." Id.
The District of Columbia had recognized a qualified privilege in the aca-
demic setting in Greenya v. George Washington University, 512 F.2d 556 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 995 (1975). In Greenya, the defendant terminated the
plaintiff's employment as a part-time, off-campus instructor. Id. at 558. The
plaintiff alleged that the chairman of the defendant's English department had
defamed him by writing "Do not staff" on an index card in the Office of Aca-
demic Staffing. Id. at 563. The court held that the faculty members enjoyed a
"qualified privilege to discuss the qualifications and character of fellow officers
and faculty members." Id.
For a discussion of precedent in the Third Circuit on the issue of disclosure
of confidential records in the academic setting, see supra note 10.
23. University of Pa., 850 F.2d at 975-76. When the defendant is an agency
of the United States, the action may, "except as otherwise provided by law, be
brought in any judicial district in which (1) a defendant in the action resides, or
(2) the cause of action arose .... ." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1982). This statute
provides authority for filing in the District of Columbia because pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-4(f), the principal office of the EEOC is in or near the District of
Columbia. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(f) (1982). However, § 2000e-5(f)(3) provides
that the action may be brought in the district in which the alleged discrimination
occurred, which in this case is the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(3) (1982). The Third Circuit stated that the action with respect to
the allegation concerning the subpoena "would be more properly brought in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania" because the employment records were located
in this district. University of Pa., 850 F.2d at 976; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c)
(1982) (action should be filed in district where such person found). It has been
noted that the venue statutes do create the possibility of contemporaneous liti-
gation of similar issues by the same parties in multiple forums. See R. PIERCE, S.
SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra note 16, § 5.6.
24. University of Pa., 850 F.2d at 976-77. The Third Circuit stated that the
first-filed rule is not a firm legal principle requiring dismissal of the second-filed
suit without regard to the circumstances. The trial judge must examine the cir-
cumstances and decide what ruling would yield the most equitable result. Id. at
5
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The court stated that although exceptions to the first-filed rule are
rare, there are certain proper bases for departure.2 5 The Third Circuit
listed four instances where departure from the rule is appropriate:
(1) when bad faith is present;2 6 (2) when the first party to file has en-
gaged in forum shopping;2 7 (3) when the second-filed action has devel-
oped further than the first;2 8 and (4) when the first suit was filed in
anticipation of an imminent action in a less favorable forum.2 9'
977. In doing so, the judge must consider the reasons for invoking the first-filed
rule. "[T]he rule's primary purpose is to avoid burdening the federal judiciary
and to prevent the judicial embarrassment of conflicting judgments." Id.
In addition,justifications for departure from the first-filed rule must be con-
sidered by the judge in exercising her discretion. The Third Circuit first sug-
gested that it might be proper for a court not to invoke the first-filed rule in
Crosley Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co., 130 F.2d 474 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 681 (1942). In this action, the Third Circuit held that
the district court judge had abused his discretion in not enjoining the second-
filed suit. Id. at 475. The court did suggest, however, that the first-filed rule
should be defeated when the second-filed suit would provide relief more expedi-
tiously and effectively, or when the first-filed suit was not brought in good faith.
Id. at 475-76.
25. University of Pa., 850 F.2d at 976-77. An example of the Third Circuit's
departure from the first-filed rule can be found in Kerotest Manufacturing Co. v.
C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co., 189 F.2d 31, 34 (3d Cir. 1951), aff'd, 342 U.S.
180 (1952). In Kerotest, the court stated that the real question is not which suit is
first-filed, but rather, which will provide relief more expeditiously and effec-
tively. Id. at 34-35 (citing Crosley v. Westinghouse, 130 F.2d at 475). Consequently,
because the second-filed action involved a party who could not be joined in the
first action, the first-filed action was dismissed in order to conserve judicial re-
sources. Id.
26. Uiiiversity of Pa., 850 F.2d at 976; see also Crosley v. 1'estinghouse, 130 F.2d
at 476 (invoked first-filed rule because no evidence first-filed suit not brought in
good faith); Berkshire Int'l Corp. v. Marquez, 69 F.R.D. 583, 588 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
(extraordinary circumstance such as bad faith not found; first-filed rule invoked).
27. University of Pa., 850 F.2d at 976; see also Mattel, Inc. v. Louis Marx &
Co., 353 F.2d 421, 424 n.4 (2d Cir. 1965) (departed from first-filed rule when
forum shopping alone motivated first filing), cert. dismissed, 384 U.S. 948 (1966);
Berkshire, 69 F.R.D. at 588 (first-filed rule invoked because no evidence forum
shopping alone motivated situs of first filing).
28. University of Pa., 850 F.2d at 976; see also Orthmann v. Apple River
Campground, Inc., 765 F.2d 119, 121 (8th Cir. 1985) (first-filed action dismissed
because second-filed action more developed); Church of Scientology v. United
States Dept. of Army, 611 F.2d 738, 750 (9th Cir. 1979) (first-filed rule not in-
voked because second-filed action had judgment on merits, appeal and remand).
29. University of Pa., 850 F.2d at 976; see also Ven Fuel, Inc. v. Department of
Treasury, 673 F.2d 1194, 1195 (11th Cir. 1982) (whether action was filed in
apparent anticipation of another proceeding is equitable consideration); Factors
Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 219 (2d Cir. 1978) (first-filed action
triggered by notice letter), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
At first blush the justification of anticipatory filing may sound identical to
that of forum shopping. However, anticipatory filing consists of more than
searching for an appropriate forum with favorable precedent, as in forum shop-
ping. An anticipatory filing is triggered by notification from the adverse party
that unless compromise is reached by a certain date, the adverse party will file
suit. Therefore, the anticipatory filer races to the courthouse with favorable pre-
cedent without putting forth best efforts toward settlement.
[Vol. 34: p. 583
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The Third Circuit found that, in view of the totality of circum-
stances of this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion by de-
parting from the first-filed rule.3 0  The court focused on the
University's attempt to avoid precedent by filing in the District of Co-
lumbia in anticipation of the EEOC subpoena enforcement action. 3'
The court stated that permitting a party to side-step precedent by using
the first-filed rule would violate the rule's equitable basis. 32
In addition to undermining precedent, the court stated that side-
stepping adverse precedent for a more favorable forum-here the Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia-would establish a "super court
of appeals" for all academic institutions who wished to maintain confi-
dentiality in the peer review process.3 3 Moreover, the Third Circuit
stated that the first-filed rule should not apply when "at least one of the
filing party's motives is to circumvent local law and preempt an immi-
nent subpoena enforcement action.' '34
Next, the Third Circuit stated that its holding was supported by sev-
eral objectives of Title VII: 35 prompt resolution of discrimination
claims and resolution through conciliation. 36 To ensure prompt resolu-
tion of discrimination charges, time limits are proscribed for processing
claims, district judges are assigned to proceedings and hearings are
scheduled as soon as possible. 37 The Third Circuit opined that if the
first-filed rule were invoked, the goal of prompt resolution would be
subverted.3 8 Further, the court stated that invoking the first-filed rule
30. University of Pa., 850 F.2d at 977.
31. Id. The court noted that the EEOC informed the University that an
enforcement action would be filed in the event the University did not comply
with the subpoena by May 4, 1987. Instead of complying or notifying the EEOC
of its intent to contest a ruling, the University filed in the District Court for the
District of Columbia on May 1, 1987. Id. at 973. Counsel for the University
conceded that the adverse precedent may have been a consideration when the
action was filed in the District of Columbia. Id. For a discussion of the adverse
precedent, see supra note 10.
32. University of Pa., 850 F.2d at 978. For a discussion of the equitable basis
of the rule, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
33. University of Pa., 850 F.2d at 978. The Third Circuit found no congres-
sional intent for the courts of the District of Columbia "to play such a pivotal
role in Title VII enforcement." Id.
34. Id.
35. For a general discussion of Title VII, see B. ScHEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra
note 6.
36. University of Pa., 850 F.2d at 978-79. The Third Circuit reasoned that to
uphold the first-filed rule in this case would contradict the congressional intent
reflected in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l)-(5) which encourages expedition of the
investigation and § 2000e-8 which permits the EEOC to obtain information to
determine if a charge is valid. Id. Further, under Title VII, the EEOC is to
encourage conference and conciliation to cause an unlawful employment prac-
tice to cease. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982).
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1982).
38. University of Pa., 850 F.2d at 978. The court does not specifically state
why invoking the first-filed rule would undermine prompt resolution of the Title
19891 589
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would frustrate Title VII's goal of conciliation by promoting discussions
about the race to the courthouse rather than discussions toward resolu-
tion of the dispute. 391
In sum, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's refusal to dis-
miss the second-filed suit because exceptional circumstances such as the
"purposes of Title VII, along with this court's precedent, and principles
underlying the first-filed rule" justified departure. 40
Where two actions, as in University of Pennsylvania, are properly filed
in different federal courts, courts have relied on the first-filed rule to
determine which suit should proceed. 4 1 Because the first-filed rule is an
VII claim. Presumably, the court is relying on the district court's order that the
EEOC subpoena be complied with as a basis for asserting that promptness will
be served by not invoking the first-filed rule.
39. Id. at 978-79.
40. Id. at 979. The Third Circuit continued its opinion with a discussion of
issues other than the first-filed rule: redacted peer review records, APA and
constitutional defenses. See id. at 979-82. The court affirmed the district court's
ruling that the University's APA and constitutional defenses were not appropri-
ate issues to be raised in this subpoena enforcement action. Id. at 982. Because
the constitutional defenses were raised and denied in EEOC v. Franklin & Mar-
shall College, 775 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986), the
Third Circuit refused to reconsider the defenses stating that neither it nor the
district court could "overrule an opinion of a previous panel." University of Pa.,
850 F.2d at 980. For a discussion of Franklin & Marshall, see supra note 10.
In regard to the APA defense, the University alleged that the EEOC created
a national policy which required full disclosure of academic peer review materi-
als. University of Pa., 850 F.2d at 981. According to the University, this was par-
ticipation in agency rulemaking without notice, which violated the APA. Id.
(citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982)). The Third Circuit, cognizant of express con-
gressional grant of authority for the EEOC to subpoena records which related to
a discrimination charge, stated that "regardless of the APA, the EEOC maintains
its ability to justify a subpoena in a particular case." Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
8(a) (1982). In addition, the court stated that consideration of the APA defense
at a subpoena enforcement action would delay the EEOC's investigation. Uni-
versify of Pa., 850 F.2d at 981. Consequently, the Third Circuit opined that the
APA rulemaking defense could not be raised at this point in the proceeding, but
did not rule out the possibility of raising the defense at a later stage. Id. at 981-
82.
The. Third Circuit vacated the portion of the district court's order which
required the University to provide records which were not redacted. Id. at 982.
Noting that the University had posited justifications for redacted records such as
EEOC acceptance of redacted records in the past, the Third Circuit stated that
notwithstanding the fact that the University had not offered redacted records, it
should be given the opportunity to do so. Id. Therefore, the Third Circuit re-
manded the redaction issue for further consideration. Id.
41. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 817 (1976). When two federal district courts contemporaneously exercise
concurrent jurisdiction, "though no precise rule has evolved, the general princi-
ple is to avoid duplicative litigation." Id. Conversely, in courts of appeals, the
record shall be filed "in that one of such courts in which a proceeding with re-
spect to such order was first instituted." 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a) (1982). Further,
the first-filed court may transfer the action to any other court of appeals "for the
convenience of the parties in the interest of justice." Id. For a discussion of
forum shopping in the appellate court context, see generally McGarity, .Miulti-
[Vol. 34: p. 583
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equitable principle, it is important to understand its underlying pur-
poses to determine whether departure is justified. First, the rule is
based on comity-a willingness on the part of courts, due to deference
and respect, to avoid interference with each other's affairs. 42 Second,
the rule provides for a single determination of a controversy which pre-
vents judicial embarrassment and avoids inconsistent burdens.4 "1 Fi-
nally, the first-filed rule promotes efficient judicial administration. 44
Clearly, these policies would have been furthered if the Third Circuit
invoked the first-filed rule in EEOC v. University of Pennsylvania. Never-
theless, the first-filed rule is equitable in nature and does not lend itself
to mechanical application. 4 5
Previous Third Circuit decisions state that the first-filed rule should
be defeated when the second-filed action would provide more expedi-
tious and effective relief or when the first-filer has other than good faith
motives. 4 6 Unfortunately, those decisions do not provide guidelines as
Party Forum Shopping for Appellate Review of Administrative Action, 129 U. PA. L. REV.
302 (1980). For a discussion of statutory jurisdiction, see supra note 23.
42. See West Gulf Maritime Ass'n v. ILA Deep Sea Local 24, 751 F.2d 721,
728 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844 (1985); see also Orthmann v. Apple River
Campground, Inc., 765 F.2d 119, 121 (8th Cir. 1985) (doctrine of federal comity
permits second-filed court to decline jurisdiction); Schauss v. Metals Depository
Corp., 757 F.2d 649, 654 (5th Cir. 1985) (comity between federal courts ad-
vanced where courts avoid hindering each other's proceedings); Washington
Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Ragonese, 617 F.2d 828, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (dis-
trict court's dismissal of first-filed action "finds ample support in traditional no-
tions of comity").
43. See University of Pa., 850 F.2d at 977 ("rule's primary purpose is to ...
prevent the judicial embarrassment of conflictingjudgments"); see also Pacesetter
Sys. v. Medtronic, Inc., 678 F.2d 93, 96 (9th Cir. 1982) ("risk of conflicting de-
terminations as to patent's validity and enforceability was clear"); Crosley Corp.
v. Hazeltine Corp., 122 F.2d 925, 930 (3d Cir. 1941) ("It is of obvious impor-
tance to all litigants to have a single determination of their controversy ......
cert. denied, 315 U.S. 813 (1942).
44. Courts wish to avoid overburdening the federal judiciary, which already
carries a heavy load of cases, and prevent economic waste when no purpose is
served by the second action. See Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co.,
342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952) (wise judicial administration regards conservation of
judicial resources); West Gulf, 751 F.2d at 729 (first-filed rule avoids waste of
duplication); Pacesetter, 678 F.2d at 96 (first-filed rule results in "economic use of
both court's resources"); Crosley v. Hazeltine, 122 F.2d at 930 (first-filed rule en-
courages efficient administration of justice without economic waste).
45. Kerotest, 342 U.S. at 183. The Court noted that other cases in the courts
of appeals do not show a rigid rule. Id. at 184 n.3. Indeed, a survey of current
opinions of the courts of appeals illustrates that the first-filed rule is not to be
applied mechanically. For a discussion of Kerotest, see supra note 3. For exam-
ples of instances in which the first-filed rule should not be invoked, see supra
notes 4, 26-29, and infra note 55 and accompanying text.
46. See Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 189 F.2d 31, 34 (3d
Cir. 1951) (first-filed action dismissed because second-filed action involved party
who could not be joined in each), aff'd, 342 U.S. 180 (1952); Crosley Corp. v.
Westinghouse Elect. & Mfg. Co., 130 F.2d 474 (3d Cir.) (suggesting second-filed
action be continued if it will provide relief more expeditiously, or lack of good
9
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to what circumstances constitute questionable conduct in instituting the
first suit and, therefore, require departure from the first-filed rule.
4 7
Decisions in other circuits do provide such guidelines and provide
justification for defeating the first-filed rule under the circumstances
presented in this case. 48 For example, the Seventh Circuit upheld the
district court's decision not to invoke the first-filed rule in Tempco Electric
Heater Corp. v. Omega Engineering, InC.4 9 The Seventh Circuit stated sev-
eral justifications for its decision: (1) Tempco's declaratory judgment ac-
tion was filed in anticipation of Omega's infringement action; (2) the
purpose of the declaratory action would be miscarried if used to choose
a forum; and (3) condoning this tactic would encourage races to the
courthouse and numerous unnecessary suits.
50
faith existed in first filing), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 681 (1942). Because the Third
Circuit stated that the lower court record was devoid of bad faith, it cannot be
said that University of Pa. falls within the lack of good faith exception as espoused
in Crosley v. Westinghouse. For a discussion of Crosley v. Westinghouse, see supra note
24.
47. However, in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad
Co., 592 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. Pa. 1984), the District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania refused to invoke the first-filed rule because of inequitable con-
duct on the part of the first-filer. Consolidated (the first-filer) filed an action for
declaratory judgment in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Id. at 564. Subse-
quently, Grand Trunk filed suit in the Eastern District of Michigan alleging that
Consolidated violated the Sherman Act. Id. at 565. The district judge for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted Grand Trunk's motion to dismiss the
first-filed action because (1) Consolidated raced to the courthouse to file suit
when they had led Grand Trunk to believe that a settlement proposal was forth-
coming, (2) Consolidated's first-filing was in anticipation of Grand Trunk's
threatened suit, and (3) this race to the courthouse was a misuse of the Declara-
tory Judgment Act. Id. at 568.
Similarities can be found in University of Pa. where the University filed in the
District Court for the District of Columbia in order to avoid adverse precedent
in the Third Circuit.
48. For a discussion of justifications for defeating the first-filed rule, see
supra notes 4, 26-29 and infra note 55 and accompanying text.
49. 819 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1987). Omega informed Tempco that Tempco
was infringing on Omega's trademark and threatened litigation in the event that
Tempco did not respond within 10 days. Id. at 746-47. This initial letter from
Omega was followed by a second threatening letter from Omega, a call from
Tempco stating that they had used the mark for a long time, communication
from Tempco indicating that they would not comply with the demand and a
third letter from Omega stating that they had no alternative but to file suit
against Tempco. Id. These actions clearly established Omega's attempts to set-
tle the dispute. Within the 10-day grace period, however, Tempco filed a declar-
atory judgment action in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
Id. at 747. Omega then filed an infringement action in the District Court of
Connecticut and sought dismissal from the Illinois district court. Id. The Sev-
enth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of Omega's motion to dismiss the
first-filed action. Id. at 747, 750.
50. Id. at 749-50. When a controversy has reached the point where one of
the parties could file suit, as Omega could in this case, a declaratory judgment
should be used "to prevent one party from continually accusing the other, to his
detriment, without allowing the other to secure an adjudication of his rights by
592
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Several of the justifications for defeating the first-filed rule found in
Tenipco are present in University of Pennsylvania. The University admit-
tedly participated in forum shopping when it filed the action in the Dis-
trict of Columbia. When pressed by the district judge, counsel for the
University replied that adverse precedent in the Third Circuit may have
been a consideration for filing in the District of Columbia. 5 1 Forum
shopping has both desirable and detrimental aspects, 52 and it is ques-
tionable whether forum shopping alone should defeat the first-filed rule.
However, forum shopping augmented by anticipatory filing should
defeat application of the first-filed rule. In University of Pennsylvania, as in
Tempco, a party filed in anticipation of the adverse party's action. 5 3 In
both cases the first-filer had been forewarned that if it did not comply
with the adverse party's request, proceedings would be initiated. 54 Such
anticipatory filing and use of the first-filed rule to preempt an adverse
party's action should not be condoned.5 5 First, as in University of Penn-
bringing suit." Id. at 749. In Tenipco, however, Omega had not engaged in such
harassing conduct. Id. Therefore, if the first-filed action were to continue, the
court would be condoning Tempco's use of a declaratory judgment for an ineq-
uitable purpose by allowing Tempco to win the race to the courthouse.
51. University of Pa., 850 F.2d at 973.
52. Although forum shopping rarely receives much attention from the lay
press, this "unseemly" practice may nonetheless lessen the public image of law-
yers and courts. McGarity, supra note 41, at 312-13. Even if the public is gener-
ally not aware of the practice of forum shopping, lawyers, parties and others
intimately involved with the legal process should view the system as impartial
and consistent in order to nurture respect for the judiciary. Forum shopping
clearly undermines these views. Forum shopping also threatens judicial comity
by straining the goodwill between federal district courts and jeopardizes federal
administrative agency "attempts to apply policy uniformly across the country."
Id. at 313-16. Subsequent litigants will race to a different circuit to obtain con-
flicting rulings. Id. at 315. Further, forum shopping wastes judicial and eco-
nomic resources. Id. at 318.
Conversely, forum shopping can be beneficial because it is a signal to the
Supreme Court that an issue requires attention. Id. at 319. In addition, forum
shopping allows the Court to observe resolution of an issue by lower courts of
differing opinions. Id. at 318-19.
McGarity concludes that forum shopping "probably cannot and should not
be avoided entirely." Id. at 306. For additional discussion of forum shopping,
see R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra note 16, § 5.6.2.
Several courts have suggested that forum shopping alone does justify de-
parture from the first-filed rule. See Berkshire Int'l Corp. v. Marquez, 69 F.R.D.
583, 588 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (first-filed rule invoked because no evidence forum
shopping alone motivated situs of filing); Rayco Mfg. Co. v. Chicopee Mfg. Corp.,
148 F. Supp. 588, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (forum shopping is a deplorable tactic).
53. For a discussion of the timing involved, see supra note 13 and accompa-
nying text.
54. Universith of Pa., 850 F.2d at 973. The University's filing in the Districi
of Columbia prior to the expiration of the grace period demonstrates that the
University had no intention of supplying the records and therefore knew that the
EEOC's Pennsylvania action was imminent.
55. See Tcmpco Elec. Heater Corp. v. Omega Eng'g, Inc., 819 F.2d 746,
749 (7th Cir. 1987) (second-filed action proceeds becausc first action was filed in
1989]
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sylvania, precedent shopping results in a particular court attracting a cer-
tain type of litigation, even though "[t]here is no indication that
Congress intended the [particular court] to play such a pivotal role."5
Second, permitting anticipatory filing discourages settlement at-
tempts in two respects. If the party who is allotted the grace period is
permitted to seek a more favorable forum, their efforts may be concen-
trated on anticipatory forum shopping rather than settlement. 5 7 In ad-
dition, the party providing the grace period will be less likely to provide
such a period in which to settle if they know their choice of forum is
likely to be lost. Thus, anticipatory forum shopping results in "an un-
seemly race to the courthouse and, quite likely, numerous unnecessary
suits-[a cost which] is simply too high." 58
Finally, the Third Circuit looked to several goals of Title VII to de-
termine whether the first-filed rule should be invoked. The court stated
that Title VII requires claims to be expedited and that the EEOC sub-
poena power enables the EEOC to fulfill this goal. 59 The court con-
cluded that the congressional goal of expediency would be thwarted if
the first-filed rule were invoked in University of Pennsylvania.6 ) The court
appears to conclude that permitting the second-filed action to proceed
will expedite the resolution of the discrimination charge because the
EEOC subpoena will be enforced. However, when deciding whether the
first or second-filed action would expedite resolution of the issue, the
court should inquire as to which forum's docket lends itself to speedier
resolution of the subpoena enforcement action. 6 1 The.Third Circuit did
not address the claim in terms of dockets or in terms of the stage of
advancement of the litigation in each forum. 6 2 The court addressed
anticipation of such); Ven-Fuel, Inc. v. Department of Treasury, 673 F.2d 1194,
1195 (11 th Cir. 1982) (refusal to hear first-filed action not abuse of discretion
when first filed in anticipation of second); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579
F.2d 215, 219 (2d Cir. 1978) (one consideration in allowing second-filed action
to proceed is when first was triggered by notice letter), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908
(1979); Yoder v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 756, 761 (E.D. Va.
1986) (second-filed action maintained when first was tactical maneuver to avoid
adverse precedent); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., 592 F.
Supp. 562, 566 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (first-filed case does not have priority when filed
in anticipation of another).
56. University of Pa., 850 F.2d at 978.
57. See id. at 979; see also Consolidated Rail, 592 F. Supp. at 568.
58. Tempco, 819 F.2d at 750. See also McGarity. supra note 41, at 318 (nu-
merous unnecessary suits where threshold jurisdictional question is at issue
rather than resolution of merits of case).
59. Univerity of Pa., 850 F.2d at 978 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(l)(l)-(5)).
60. id., at 978-79. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's application of
Title VII in I'niversit of Pa., see supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
61 . After all, it is the subpoena enforcement action, not the discrimination
charge that is at issue in hoth district courts.
62. If the second-filed action has proceeded further than the first-filed ac-
tion, in order to ex)edite resolution, the second-tiled action should not be en-
joined. See Orthmann v. Apple River Campground, Inc., 765 F.2d 119, 121 (8th
594 [Vol. 34: p. 583
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only the rationale for the EEOC's subpoena power. This leads one to
believe that enforcement of the subpoena was at the root of this "justifi-
cation" for departure from the first-filed rule.
Additionally, the Third Circuit stated that the EEOC's duty to elimi-
nate discrimination through conciliation would be frustrated if the first-
filed rule were applied. 6 3 The court hypothesized that rather than at-
tempting to resolve a dispute in good faith, a party might put its efforts
toward filing in a forum with favorable precedent.6 4 Although this may
be true, it cannot be said that the EEOC made an earnest attempt to
conciliate. Despite the fact that precedent existed in the Third Circuit
where an EEOC subpoena was enforced only when modified to request
redacted records, the EEOC did not offer to modify the subpoena in this
case.6 5 Because the EEOC contributed to undermining the congres-
sional goal of resolution through conciliation, it cannot be said that in-
voking the first-filed rule in this instance would circumvent this goal of
Title VII.
CONCLUSION
Although several of the Third Circuit's jurisdictions for defeating
the first-filed rule do not appear well founded, it is submitted that the
Third Circuit properly concluded that the first-filed rule should not be
invoked under the circumstances presented in EEOC v. University of Penn-
sylvania.6( Notwithstanding the fact that the University's injunctive and
declaratory judgment action were properly filed in the District of Co-
lumbia, the University admittedly considered the adverse precedent in
the Third Circuit when it filed in the District of Columbia prior to the
expiration of the grace period allotted by the EEOC. As a survey of
decisions in various courts of appeals illustrates, racing to the court-
house in anticipation of an imminent suit in a less favorable forum is a
factor which weighs against invoking the first-filed rule."
7
Moreover, the first-filed rule should not be applied as rigidly as it
was in the Third Circuit decisions of the 1940's. Rather the rule should
respond to the equities of the circumstances presented.", This ruling
Cir. 1985). There is no indication that the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ac-
tion had proceeded further than the District of Columbia action.
63. University of Pa., 850 F.2d at 978-79. "[Tlhe Commission shall endeavor
to eliminate . . . alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of
conference, conciliation, and persuasion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982).
64. LbiiversilV of Pa., 850 F.2d at 979.
65. The Third Circuit enforced a subpoena only after modifying the re-
quest to redact the records in EEOC v. Franklin & Marshall College, 775 F.2d
I 10 (3d Cir. 1985), cerl. denied, 467 U.S. 1163 (1986). For the holding in Franklil
& Marshall, see supra note 10.
66. 850 F.2d 969 (3d Cir.), cert. granled in pait, 109 S. Ct. 554 (1988).
67. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
68. For a discussion of the Third Circuit decisions of the 1940's, see supra
notes 3, 21, 24 and accompanying text.
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brings the Third Circuit in step with other courts of appeals by ex-
panding the justifications for departure from the first-filed rule to in-
clude questionable conduct of the first-filer such as racing to the
courthouse in anticipation of imminent action in a forum with adverse
precedent. Such use of the trial court's discretion should be condoned
as this will diminish litigants' attempts to misuse the first-filed rule.
Jean D. Renshaw
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